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An Insider's Perspective on the Significance of 
the German Criminal Theory's General System 
for Analyzing Criminal Acts 
Professor Dr. Wolfgang Naucke* 
Over the past several years, increasing attention has been 
paid in the United States to German criminal law and criminal 
theory. This is a reflection not only of the preeminent position 
of German criminal law in countries outside the common law or- 
bit,' but also of the burgeoning literature on the German crimi- 
nal system in the United  state^.^ This article 'explores one of the 
* Vice President, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt a.M., West Ger- 
many; Professor of Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Criminology, and Legal Philoso- 
phy, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University. An earlier version o f  this paper was presented 
to  the law faculty at U.C.L.A. during 1979. The author wishes to thank Mr. David Morri- 
son, J.D., who was a Fulbright Scholar at the faculty of  law, University o f  Frankfurt a.M. 
in 1979, for assistance in translating this paper. He also wishes to  thank Professor W .  
Cole Durham, Jr. o f  the J .  Reuben Clark Law School for assistance in preparation of  the 
introduction to  this article and in making a number o f  refinements in the text. 
1. See Hall & Wagner, Foreword to  Symposium: The New German Penal Code, 24 
AM. J. COMP. L. 589, 589 (1976); Durham, Book Review, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 629, 634. 
2. See, eg.,  G. FLETCHER, ETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978); J .  LANGBEIN, COMPARA- 
TIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY (1977); Arzt, Responses to the Growth of Crime in  
the United States and West Germany: A Comparison of Changes in  Criminal Law and 
Societal Attitudes, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 43 (1979); Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in  
Germany, 96 HARV. L REV 1032 (1983); Clausnitzer, The Statute of Limitations for 
Murder in  the Federal Republic of Germany, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 473 (1980); Daly, 
Intoxication and Crime: A Comparative Approach, 27 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 378 (1978); 
Damaska, The Reality of Prosecutorial Discretion: Comments on a German Monograph, 
29 AM. J .  COMP. L. 119 (1981); Eser, The Politics of Criminal Law Reform: Germany, 21 
AM. J. COMP. L 245 (1973); Felstiner, Plea Contracts in  West Germany, 13 LAW & SOC'Y 
REV. 309 (1979); Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robin- 
son, 23 UCLA L. REV 293 (1975); Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: 
A Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 ISRAEL L. REV. 367 (1973); Fletcher, The 
Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 401 (1971); 
Goldstein & Marcus, Comment on Continental Criminal Procedure, 87 YALE L.J. 1570 
(1978); Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in  Three "Inquisitorial" 
Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977); Herrmann, The Rule of 
Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion in  Germany, 41 U. 
CHI.  L. REV. 468 (1974); Horton, Life Imprisonment and Pardons in the German Federal 
Republic, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 530 (1980); Horton, Abortion Law Reform in the Ger- 
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central structural features of German criminal law, which can be 
described as the German theory's "general system for analyzing 
criminal acts." (The underlying German term, Straftatsystem, 
has no precise English equivalent and can also be translated as 
the "general system for structuring criminal analysis," or more 
briefly, as the "general analytical system" or as the "criminal 
analysis struct~re."~- These phrases will be used interchangeably 
man Federal Republic, 28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 288 (1979); Hoskins, A Comparative Anal- 
ysis of the Crime of Conspiracy in  Germany, France and the United States, 6 N.Y.U. J.  
INT'L L. & POL. 245 (1973); Hughes, Pleas Without Bargains, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 753 
(1981); Johnson & Drew, This Nation Has Money for Everything-Except Its Courts, 17 
JUDGES' J ,  Summer 1978, a t  8; Kappel & Leuteritz, Wife Battering i n  the Federal Re- 
public o f  Germany, 5 VICTIMOLOGY 225 (1980); Langbein, Judging Foreign Judges Badly: 
Nose Counting Isn't Enough, 18 JUDGES' J. 4 (1979); Langbein, Land Without Plea Bar- 
gaining: How the Germans Do I t ,  78 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1979); Langbein & Weinreb, 
Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549 (1978); Mc- 
Gehee, Child Abuse i n  the Federal Republic of Germany, 6 VICTIMOLOGY 215 (1981); 
O'Keefe & Czeniek, A S tudy  of the Drug Laws of the Federal Republic of Germany, 32 
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 488 (1977); Peltzer, The  Criminal Responsibility and Personal 
Liability of  the Director in  the Bankruptcy of His Company: Germany, 9 INT'L BUS. 
LAW. 33 (1981); Scheerer, The  New Dutch and German Drug Laws: Social and Political 
Conditions for Criminalization and Decriminalization, 12 L. & SOC'Y REV. 585 (1978); 
Silving, Comments on  Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws-A Comparative Analysis, 
34 REVISTA DEL COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE P.R. 107 (1973); Symposium: The New German 
Penal Code, 24 AM. J.  COMP. L. 589 (1976) (articles by Arzt, Binavince, Darby, Eser, 
Fletcher, Hall, Herrmann, Luderssen, Oehler, Ryu, Silving, and Wagner); Teske & Ar- 
nold, Comparison of  the Criminal Statistics o f  the United States and the Federal Re- 
public o f  Germany, 10 J.  CRIM JUST. 359 (1982); Volkmann-Schluck, Continental Euro- 
pean Criminal Procedures: True or Illusive Model?, 9 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1981); Weigend, 
Sentencing i n  West Germany, 42 MD L. REV. 37 (1983); Note, Anti-Terrorism: The  
West German Approach, 3 FORDHAM INT'L L.F. 167 (1980); Note, Positivist Roots of 
Criminal Law and the  West German Criminal Law Reform, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 613 
(1979); Comment, The  West German Day-Fine System: A Possibility for the United 
States?, 50 U .  CHI. L. REV. 281 (1983). 
3. Literally translated, "Straftatsystem" means simply "criminal act system," but 
this translation fails to convey the structural and methodological significance of the 
Straftatsystem as a basic organizing principle of German criminal law. No translation of 
the term can be fully adequate, since there is no precise equivalent to the Straftatsystem 
within the American legal system and American legal practice. Thus, any set of English 
words will fail to adequately convey what is involved because of the lack of a correspond- 
ing institutional referent within American legal culture. In an effort to  bridge this lan- 
guage gap, i t  has proven useful to employ a number of English terms that would not be 
obvious choices a t  the level of literal translation. The word "general" is added to indicate 
the expectation that the Straftatsystem is the method of analysis to be applied in all 
cases. Moreover, the Straftatsystem is general in the same sense that the "general part" 
(allgemeiner Teil)  of criminal law is general: it relates to features of criminal conduct 
that go beyond the specific crimes of the "special part" (besonderer Teil). Not surpris- 
ingly, German texts on the general part are typically organized around the basic features 
of the general system for structuring criminal analysis. See, e.g., J .  BAUMANN. 
STRAFRECHT: ALLCEMEINER TEIL (8th ed. 1977); H. JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS: 
ALLGEMEINER TEIL (3d ed. 1978); R. MAURACH, DEUTSCHES TRAFRECHT: ALLCEMEINER 
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in this article to refer to the German Straftatsystem.) This sys- 
tem is an intellectual framework that defines and delimits the 
approach that a German jurist adopts in determining whether 
particular conduct violates the norms of the substantive criminal 
law. I t  is parallel in systemic significance to the Model Penal 
Code's innovative "element analysis" method~logy,~ but has 
much deeper philosophical and cultural roots. This article will 
TEIL (4th ed. 1971); E. SCHMIDH~USER, STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL (2d ed. 1975); G. 
STRATENWERTH, STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL (3d ed. 1981). 
The terms "analyzing" and "analytical" are used because the Straftatsystem is fun- 
damentally concerned with what American lawyers would describe as legal analysis. 
More particularly, the Straftatsystem provides a structure for analyzing the basic con- 
stituents of criminal liability: whether the relevant prohibitory norm has been violated, 
whether justificatory circumstances are present, and whether culpability or accountabil- 
ity is negated by pertinent excusing conditions. Technically, i t  might be more accurate to 
think of the Straftatsystem as an effort a t  "synthesis" rather than "analysis," since its 
key function is to bring together the various constituents of liability and the wider values 
that shape our thought about criminal norms, justifications, and excuses in a structured 
methodology for resolving particular cases. But Americans tend to use the term "anely- 
sis" indiscriminately to  cover both the "breaking down" (analytic) and the "gathering 
together" (synthetic) aspects of the process of reasoning used in deciding cases. "Ansly- 
sis" is thus the better term to use in conveying the meaning of Straftatsystem to Ameri- 
can lawyers. 
The terms "structure" and "structuring" used in two of the suggested translations 
reflect the fact that the Straftatsystem constitutes not only a method of analysis, but a 
structure or structuring of thought. Perhaps these come to the same thing, but there are 
contexts in which the structural dimension of the Straftatsystem is not adequately 
evoked by the English word "system." The term System in German has stronger struc- 
tural overtones than the cognate English term. 
One further point about the term System must be made. The Straftatsystem is not 
to be thought of as a system of criminal law in the sense that one might speak of a 
"philosophical systemw-i.e., as a theoretical or metaphysical construct accounting for a 
particular sector of thought or reality. This is not to say that German criminal theorists 
have not utilized the Straftatsystem as a central feature of comprehensive accounts of 
German criminal law. They have. Indeed, as noted above, most texts on the "general 
part" of German criminal law are organized around the basic features of the Straftatsys- 
tem. Moreover, as this article contends, the general system for analyzing criminal acts 
does reflect a constellation of values connected with the ideal of rule of law (Rechtsstaat- 
lichkeit). Conceivably, in an  age more conducive to philosophical system building, a 
criminal theorist might attempt to construct a system embodying these values. The point 
for present purposes, however, is that Straftatsystem is to be thought of as a practical, 
systematic method for structuring analysis of liability for criminal actions, rather than as 
some particular thinker's philosophical systematization of criminal law. 
German criminal law scholars often refer not only to the Straftatsystem, but also to 
the Straftatlehre (literally, "criminal act doctrine"). The latter is merely the body of 
doctrine or theory about the former. No effort has been made to distinguish between 
translations of these two terms in this article, since from the perspective of American 
readers, the two blend together as a linked theoretical approach to analyzing criminal 
liability. 
4. See generally Robinson & Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liabil- 
ity: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681 (1983). 
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describe how the general analytical system operates in practice 
and will then explore the deeper values it reflects and protects. 
My aim is to provide an overview of a central feature of German 
criminal methodology, and then to reflect a t  a more general level 
on the relationship between legal methodology and legal values. 
A. "Wild Postering": A Representative Problem 
For those familiar with the significance of the "general the- 
ory for analyzing criminal actsw5 in German criminal thought, 
the topic addressed by this article may sound extremely broad. I 
think, however, that the subject is central to a number of signifi- 
cant theoretical and practical issues. The nature of the subject 
may become more clear if I begin with a legal issue that is cur- 
rently the subject of frequent debate in Germany. 
German courts are time and again confronted by the follow- 
ing set of facts: A group of young people has difficulty gaining 
public attention for their political views, and to remedy this 
problem they decide to "advertise." They have some posters 
printed and paste them up as firmly as possible in as many loca- 
tions as they see fit.6 The modern glues are quite permanent, 
and the material is often bonded to the surface to which it is 
attached. I t  is usually a tremendous inconvenience to remove 
the posters or fliers, and is sometimes impossible. 
Under German criminal law, the question is whether the 
foregoing conduct is sufficient to constitute the crime of damag- 
ing property under section 303 of the German Criminal Code.? 
There are conflicting opinions, and the courtse and scholarse de- 
5. See supra note 3. 
6. In Germany this is called wildes Plakatieren, which may be translated as "wild 
postering," or more tamely, as "unauthorized advertising." 
7. Section 303 provides, "Wer rechtswidrig eine fremde Sache beschadigt oder zer- 
stort, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu zwei Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft." 
STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] 9 303 (W. Ger.). This may be translated as follows: "Whoever 
wrongfully damages or destroys an object not belonging to him shall be punished by 
imprisonment for a term not to exceed two years or by a fine." 
8. See Oberlandesgericht [OLG], Oldenburg, W. Ger., 1978 JURI~TEN ZEITUNG [JZ] 
70; OLG, Karlsruhe, W. Ger., 1978 JZ 72; OLG, Oldenburg, W. Ger., 1978 NEUE JURIS- 
TISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1656; OLG, Karlsruhe, W. Ger., 1978 NJW 1636; see also 
1978 NJW 1637-42; Judgment of Nov. 13, 1979, Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen 
[BGHST], W. Ger., 29 BGHST 129. 
9. See, e.g., 1 R. MAURACH & F. SCHR~DER. STRAFRECHT: BESONDERER TEIL 267 (6th 
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fend their views with numerous arguments. I t  is unsettled 
whether firmly pasting a flier or poster on an object damages 
that object. Those who believe that it does must turn to further 
questions. Conceivably, such property damage is justified by the 
right to freedom of speech. Even someone who does not accept 
the argument that free speech rights legitimize property damage 
might still argue that the young people should not be punished 
because they (mistakenly) thought that their right to freedom of 
speech justified their actions. These are difficult legal issues in 
Germany and they place great demands on the breadth and pre- 
cision of analysis. 
B. Fundamental Tools of Legal Analysis in the German 
System 
The German lawyer must have total command of two fun- 
damental and distinct tools of legal analysis to discuss properly 
the question of the punishability of unauthorized advertising: 
knowledge of the pertinent code sections and mastery of the 
general system for analyzing criminal acts. 
1.  Knowledge of code provisions 
Knowledge of the the pertinent code sections entails knowl- 
edge not only of the wording of the applicable statutory texts 
but also a sound understanding of how they are to be inter- 
preted. In the "wild postering" situation, one must know the 
text of section 303 of the German Criminal Code. According to 
the text of section 303, the damage or destruction of an object is 
a prerequisite for liability. The German lawyer must be aware 
that, according to the accepted interpretation of section 303, 
cases of unauthorized advertising fall within the statute's prohi- 
bition of "damaging" as opposed to "destroying" property.l0 He 
or she must also be conscious of the various legal interpretations 
of the word "damage." Interpretations of this term are associ- 
ed. 1977); STREE, STRAFGESETZBUCH: KOMMENTAR, •˜ 303, Marginal No. 8 (A. Schonke & H. 
SchrSder, 21st ed. 1982). For a summary of the various positions, see Dolling, 
Sachbeschadigung durch Plakatieren uom Gebrauchsgegenstiinden, 1981 NJW 207; 
Gossel, Wildes Plakatieren und Sachbeschadigung im Sinne des $ 303 STGB, 1980 
JURISTISCHE RUNDSCHAU [JR] 184; Maiwald, Unbefugtes Plakatieren ohne Sub- 
stanzuerletzung keine Sachbeschadigung?, 1980 J Z  256; Thoss, Sachbeschadigung 
durch unbefugtes Plakatieren?, 1978 NJW 1612; Katzer, Das unbefugte Plakatieren als 
Auslegungsproblem der Sachbeschadigung (8 303 STGB) (Diss. Frankfurt a.M. 1982). 
10. See supra note 7 .  
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ated with three different views of the interests protected by sec- 
tion 303. The interests protected by this statute might reflect 
concerns with (1) the physical integrity of the object; (2) the ob- 
ject's functional capacities; or (3) the authority of the owner to 
determine what can and cannot be done with the object." If the 
protected interest is seen as the physical integrity or the func- 
tional capacity of the property, unauthorized advertising does 
not constitute damaging property. Pasting up a placard usually 
destroys neither the physical integrity nor the functional capac- 
ity of an object. If, on the other hand, the interest protected by 
making it a crime to damage property is the owner's authority 
over the object, then unauthorized advertising does constitute 
damaging property. Indeed, unauthorized advertising unavoid- 
ably invades the authority of the owner over his property. 
Familiarity with, and the ability to discuss, these issues are 
part of the knowledge of the code that is required for a German 
jurist to work effectively with section 303. 
2. The general system for analyzing criminal acts 
Familiarity with the code, however, does not provide the 
German lawyer with enough knowledge to make a thorough legal 
analysis of unauthorized advertising. He must also be master of 
the second tool of legal analysis, the general system for analyz- 
ing criminal acts. In this general analytical system are collected 
those features of crime that are common to all crimes, whether it 
be damaging property, theft, murder, or anything else.12 If, 
therefore, unauthorized advertising is to be punishable under 
German law, it must be found to exhibit the general paradig- 
matic features of crime as determined by German criminal the- 
ory, as well as the particular elements of section 303 established 
by statute. 
By pouring the question of liability for specific conduct 
through the filter of the general system for analyzing criminal 
acts, we are adding something-and not just a little some- 
11. See, e.g., G.  ARZT, STRAFRECHT. BESONDERER TEIL, VERM~GENSDELIKTE 9 ff. 1978; 
1 R. MAURACH & F SCHR~DER. ST AFRECHT. BESONDERER TEIL 265 ff. (6th ed. 1977)'('Das 
Wesen der Sachbeschiidigung"). 
12. For an overview of the West German literature, see BAUMANN, STRAFRECHT: ALL- 
CEMEINER TEIL 171 ff. (8th ed. 1977); H. JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS: ALLCE- 
MEINER TEIL 155 ff. (3d ed. 1978); 1 R. MAURACH & H. ZIPF, STRAFRECHT: ALLCEMEINER 
TEIL 157 ff. (6th ed. 1983); E. SCHMIDHAUSER, STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER T IL 22 ff., 139 
ff. (2d ed. 1975); G.  STRATENWERTH. S RAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER T IL I 57 ff. (3d ed. 1981). 
3051 ANALYZING CRIMINAL ACTS 311 
thing-to the law as written by the legislature. My central con- 
cern in this article is this "filling out" of the code's text by the 
general analytical system. In order to appreciate how this "filling 
out" process operates, we turn first to a brief description of the 
main elements of the system. 
The general analytical system describes the main features of 
criminal action with the German terms Tatbestandsmassigkeit 
(definition of the offense), Rechtswidrigkeit (wrongfulness), and 
Schuld (culpability).13 Whatever the governing code provision 
may be, every criminal act must be wrongful and culpable con- 
duct that conforms to (i.e., is violative of) the definition of the 
offense. Unauthorized advertising can only be punished if it vio- 
lates the definition, is wrongful, and is culpable. These central 
elements are discussed with much effort and pomp in Germany. 
13. These translations of the German terminology are necessarily rough and imper- 
fect. The basic structural features of criminal action they identify and the contrasts be- 
tween them have been explored a t  length by Professor George P. Fletcher. See G. 
FLETCHER, ETHINKING CRIMINAL AW 454-504, 552-69, 575-79 (1978); see also Durham, 
Book Review, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 629, 634-40. In the main, the translations I am using 
follow those used by Professor Fletcher, but a few comments are in order. 
First, Tatbestandsmassigkeit connotes more than what American lawyers normally 
mean by the definition of an offense. The first part of the word, Tatbestand, means 
"that of which the [criminal] act consists." The suffix -massigkeit means "the state or 
condition of being subject to." In actuality, then, the German term refers not to the 
definition of an offense itself, but to the state of being subject to or in conformity with 
(i.e., in violation of) the definition or prohibitory norm (which specifies what the criminal 
act consists of). In many ways, the phrase "elements of an offense" constitutes a better 
translation of the core term Tatbestand, since it preserves the German term's ambiguous 
reference to both the norm and the prohibited conduct. One could thus translate 
Tatbestandsmassigkeit as "the state or condition of fulfilling the defined elements of a 
criminal offense." I t  is simpler, however, to refer to this feature of criminal acts as the 
definition of the offense, or as the state of fulfilling or violating the definition. 
Turning to Rechtswidrigkeit, I prefer the translation "wrongfulness" to Fletcher's 
rendition of the term as "wrongdoing." A literal translation would be "the state or condi- 
tion of being against the law" or more simply "unlawfulness." I share Fletcher's view 
that this is inadequate because, to an American reader, this might suggest that Recht- 
swidrigkeit has to  do  only with the state or condition of being inconsistent with positive 
law. The German term Recht, which means both "law" and "right" has moral overtones 
that are independent of positive law. While I thus agree with Fletcher on the major 
translation issue here-namely, that an unduly positivistic rendition should be 
avoided-I prefer "wrongfulness" to "wrongdoing" because the former preserves the 
sense that Rechtswidrigkeit is a characteristic of actions, rather than the "doing" itself. 
Schuld could be literally translated as "guilt," but the question of guilt tends to be 
thought of in English as the final determination that a defendant is criminally liable, not 
as a more limited issue about whether the defendant may fairly be held accountable for 
his conduct. "Culpability," with its overtones of accountability and moral responsibility, 
is a closer translation. 
312 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I984 
The discussion, however, has not achieved a conclusive result.14 
A few main points, however, are undisputed. 
a .  T h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of a n  o f f e n s e .  T h e  word 
Tatbestandsmassigkeit embraces all of the elements of a partic- 
ular crime that are found in the applicable code section. A rough 
American equivalent would be the phrase "elements of the of- 
fense."16 There is a Tatbestand or definition of theft, homicide, 
fraud, and so on. The problems of interpretation mentioned ear- 
lier16 that arise in connection with applying section 303 to "wild 
postering" are questions about whether such conduct fits within 
the scope of the definition of damaging property. A German law 
student writing an exam on this issue, or for that matter, a Ger- 
man judge deciding a "wild postering" case, would be regarded 
as engaging in improper analysis if he or she tried to treat these 
questions at  a different stage of the analysis-i.e., as an issue of 
wrongfulness or culpability. 
Demanding that the problem of determining which legal in- 
terest is protected by section 303 be treated as a problem of the 
definition of damaging property affects more than the mere for- 
mal ordering of legal analysis. This demand also aids the deci- 
sion of substantive issues. The content of the definition of a 
crime cannot be extended beyond that formulated by the legisla- 
ture. In the context of section 303, for example, the authority of 
the property owner to determine what may happen to his prop- 
erty is protected only to the extent this authority is asserted to 
prevent damage to, or destruction of, the property. From this 
perspective it would take a strained interpretation to hold unau- 
thorized advertising to be a violation of section 303, since such 
conduct leaves the property intact and intrudes solely upon the 
owner's authority. Further, the notion of Tatbestandsmassigkeit 
itself, in its German usage, necessarily implies that the perpetra- 
tor's deed ( T a t )  be unambiguously and conspicuously antisocial. 
If, however, the definition of the crime of damaging property 
were tied to the authority of the owner to control his property, 
the determination of whether a particular act satisfied the ele- 
ments of the definition would be dependent upon whether the 
property owner viewed the act as an incursion upon his author- 
14. See H .  JESCHECK. LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS. ALLGEMEINER TEIL 159-72 (3d ed. 
1978); E. SCHMIDHAUSER, STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 159 ff. (2d ed. 1975). 
15. See supra note 13. 
16. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
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ity. But this latter definition does not comport with accepted 
theory concerning the nature of the definition of criminal acts. 
Thus, this theory makes it more difficult to punish "wild poster- 
ing" as a violation of section 303.17 
b. Wrongfulness. Rechtswidrigkeit, or wrongfulness, 
embraces all the statutory and extrastatutory general grounds 
for holding that conduct which is violative of the definition may 
still be found to be justified, thereby escaping punishment. Self- 
defense is a classic justification that negates the wrongfulness of 
an act. The right to free speech, which some "wild posterers" 
cite as the source of the legitimacy of their activity, is a doubtful 
justification in their case;lB but it is in any event an argument 
that must be legally analyzed under the heading of wrongful- 
ness. The category of wrongfulness in the general analytical sys- 
tem not only provides the proper place for the discussion of such 
justifications but also provokes the discussion of doubtful 
justification. 
c. Culpability. The first task of the element of Schuld 
or culpability in the general analytical system is to secure the 
status of culpability as an indispensible prerequisite to punish- 
ment. A result of the culpability requirement is that the lawyer 
must carefully consider possible grounds for excusing the actor, 
even though his conduct is violative of the definition of the 
crime and is wrongful. Insanity and duress are illuminating ex- 
amples of the doctrines that serve to negate culpability in this 
manner. A party availing himself of either of these defenses typ- 
ically claims that while he has engaged in conduct specified in 
the definition of some crime, and though he has done so without 
justification, he cannot fairly be held responsible for what he 
did. 
Legal discussions of unauthorized advertising commonly en- 
counter the view that this conduct conforms to the definition of 
damaging property and is wrongful. Those who defend this posi- 
tion are not, however, finished with their analysis. They must 
take up the further problem presented by the possibility that 
the actor thought he had a right to paste up posters. In the 
terms of the theory of the general analytical system, this is a 
17. See OLG. Karlsruhe, W.Ger., 1978 JZ 72; Thoss, supra note 9, at 1613. 
18. Just as in the United States, free speech rights in West Germany constitute con- 
straints on state action, and do not confer unfettered license to encroach on the rights of 
others. 
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problem of culpability. A perhaps overly simplistic formulation 
is that the category of culpability marshals all of the arguments 
favoring a finding of not guilty that are based on the subjective 
state of the accused and insures that they are considered in 
every case. 
C. Application of the General Analytical System 
Knowledge of the statute and the general system for analyz- 
ing criminal acts are the two tools of analysis that the German 
criminal lawyer must employ in order to decide every case. The 
law student must, from the very beginning of his studies, be- 
come sure of his ability to handle both. The practicing criminal 
lawyer is, for the most part, uninterested in the subtleties of the 
academic discussion of refinements in the theory of the general 
analytical system, but he recognizes that the basic elements of 
the structure guide his work. This can be seen in the German 
courts' decisions on unauthorized advertising. Judges apply the 
general analytical system as a matter of course as the framework 
for analyzing and deciding cases.'@ 
The use of these two tools of analysis is made more interest- 
ing by a further feature of the legal landscape. The power to 
decide cases is not evenly distributed between the statute and 
the general analytical system. Rather, the latter is given priority. 
Law students learn, for example, that a statute can only be ap- 
plied in a manner permitted by the system. Every statute must 
submit to being reordered and reinterpreted by way of the gen- 
eral analytical system before it can be applied. The statute as 
formulated by the legislature is not applied directly; prior to ap- 
plication the statute is passed through the sieve of this system 
and undergoes a structural metamorphosis in that process. 
Thus, the provision of the German Criminal Code covering 
damage to property is not applied directly and verbatim to the 
case of unauthorized advertising. I t  must first be subjected to 
the strict regimen of the general analytical system. Its provisions 
must first be dissected into the categories of the definition, 
wrongfulness, and culpability, and only then applied. 
19. See, e.g., OLG, Oldenburg, W. Ger., 1978 JZ 70; OLG, Karlsruhe, W. Ger., 1978 
NJW 1636; 29 BGHST 129. 
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I t  can be concluded from the discussion to this point that 
the general system for analyzing criminal acts is successfully 
able to force conformity with its dictates upon criminal statutes. 
Its structuring of legal materials and legal analysis transcends 
the dictates of the positive law. This is a rather remarkable state 
of affairs. In accord with the tradition in Europe since the Ren- 
aissance, German criminal law is inseparably bound to legisla- 
tion. The maxim nulla poena sine lege, with its requirements of 
prospectivity and fair warning by statute, is a zealously guarded 
constitutional principle in West Germany;20 and yet, the same 
criminal law that is supposedly bound to and by legislation 
yields to the nonlegislated general system for analyzing criminal 
acts. 
I want to discuss some troubling aspects of this relationship 
between legislation and the general analytical system. The goal 
is to justify, if possible, the preeminent position of this system 
vis-a-vis legislation. 
A. Transpositive Features of the General Analytical System 
The German Criminal Code itself does not require that at- 
tention be paid to the general system for analyzing criminal acts. 
The Code does presuppose application of the system a t  many 
points. The words for definition, wrongfulness, and culpability 
are repeatedly usede21 But this is not a consistent legislative 
practice. No provision exists from which one could derive the 
legislative intent that the structure be used in applying the 
Code's sections. 
German scholars of the nineteenth and early twentieth cen- 
turies thought that they could derive the main features of the 
general structure by studying the text of the Code.22 They 
thought of the Code as a kind of physical object, and hoped that 
by constantly observing it they could discover its inner order. 
20. GRUNDCESETZ [GG] art. 103 abs. 2 ( W .  Ger.); STGB 8 1 ( W .  Ger.); see P. BOCK- 
ELMANN, STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 10 ff. (3d ed. 1979); J. WESSELS, STRAFRECHT: 
ALLGEMEINER TEIL 8 ff. (12th ed. 1982). 
21. See, e.g., STGB •˜ 11 abs. 1 nr. 5 (W. Ger.); see also id. $8 13, 17, 20, 32, 34, 35. 
22. See, e.g., E. BELING. DIE LEHRE VOM VERBRECHEN (1906); K. BINDING. DIE 
NORMEN UND IHRE UBERTRETUNC (1872); F. VON LISZT, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN 
STRAFRECHTS 116 ff. (14th ed. 1905). 
316 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I984 
The structure of offenses seemed to be a kind of scientific dis- 
covery. The requirement of respect for the structure was 
founded on its status as a law of nature. 
This justification of the preeminence of the general analyti- 
cal system underestimates, however, the nature of the claim that 
this system makes. This justification rests on the notion that the 
main features of the general system are an intrinsic part of the 
Code;23 but the argument has a scarcely acceptable consequence. 
Another set of statutes-for example, a code that did not recog- 
nize wrongfulness or culpability as prerequisites of punish- 
ment-would of necessity lead quickly and unswervingly to an- 
other theory of the structure of offenses. This is precisely what 
the general analytical system will not allow. I t  is not tied to a 
given body of positive law. Rather, the theory of the general an- 
alytical system requires that all positive legislation conform to 
it. 
The fact that the positive criminal law of a particular coun- 
try a t  a particular time happens to give credence to the catego- 
ries of definition, wrongfulness, and culpability is a political ac- 
cident. A theory of the general structure of crimes cannot be 
founded on such an accident. Put  another way, the general sys- 
tem for analyzing crimes demands to be recognized even when 
the positive criminal law does not conform to it. Legal theory 
then becomes criticism of nonconforming positive law. At any 
rate, it is clear that the general analytical system is not derived 
from the positive law; on the contrary, it comes before and sets 
itself above positive law. 
B. The Propriety of Placing the General Analytical System 
Above the Positive Law 
We are left with the question of whether such patronizing 
treatment of legislation is acceptable in a legal system in which 
statute is supreme. With respect to this question, the credentials 
of the general system for structuring criminal analysis are im- 
pressive. The system is often praised in German literature as the 
guarantor of order, certainty, and impartiality in the application 
of individual statutes.24 These credentials provide some insight 
23. See, e.g., H. JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS: ALLCEMEINER TEIL 157 (3d 
ed. 1978); H. WELZEL, DAS DEUTSCHE STRAFRECHT 37-38 (11th ed. 1969); H. MAYER, 
STRAFRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 41-42 (1953). 
24. See H. JESCHECK. LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS: ALLCEMEINER TEIL 155-57 (3d ed. 
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into the vastness of the claim staked out by the general analyti- 
cal structure on the landscape of the criminal law. In Germany, 
this general analytical system is the hallmark of sophisticated 
lawyerly professionalism. Let legislators write the statutes as 
they please-our structure insures at  least order, certainty, and 
impartiality in the statutes' application. This is the first clear 
signal that the general analytical system entails more than a for- 
mal model that helps one better organize and explicate statutory 
language. Embodied within the general system for structuring 
criminal analysis are certain basic elements that are essential to 
any process that calls itself just. 
Admittedly, an explanation of why the general analytical 
system developed its particular structural features (i.e., violation 
of the definition, wrongfulness, and culpability) is still required. 
A continuing respect for these elements promotes order, cer- 
tainty, and impartiality in the administration of justice. But 
these goals are attainable in other ways. One could, for example, 
number the characteristics of a particular crime arbitrarily, be- 
ginning with number one and ending when each characteristic 
had been assigned a number. Order, certainty, and impartiality 
could be insured by requiring courts to work down this checklist 
in every case.26 
However, much more than the simple, formal ordering of 
the process of deciding an individual criminal case is sought in 
German criminal law by invoking the general system for analyz- 
ing criminal acts and, in particular, by structuring analysis in 
terms of the categories of violation of the definition, wrongful- 
ness, and culpability. These categories seek rather to impose cer- 
tain substantive values in connection with the making of partic- 
ular decisions-values that are not necessarily contained in the 
individual criminal statutes being applied. 
The substance imparted by the three main categories of the 
general analytical structure is different for each category. The 
category of violation of the definition seeks to insure that the 
criminal justice system does not impose criminal liability with- 
out first establishing that a precise statutory rule has been bro- 
ken by the perpetrator. The category of wrongfulness seeks to 
1978); Welzel, Zur Dogmatik im Strafrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT UR MAURACH 3 (1972). 
25. Element analysis under the American Law Institute's MODEL PENAL CODE pro- 
ceeds in essentially this fashion. It assumes that the process of carving up the character- 
istics of a crime is essentially arbitrary, and that the only genuine issue to be faced in 
making a determination of liability is whether all the elements have been satisfied. 
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insure that general justificatory exceptions militating against lia- 
bility are sought, clarified, and considered in every case. The 
category of culpability seeks to insure that punishment does not 
follow on the mere showing that, objectively viewed, a rule has 
been violated without justification. I t  forces attention to the per- 
son of the perpetrator and requires special attention to the ex- 
cuses he offers for his 
Clearly, then, the substantive values of the general analyti- 
cal structure entail a precise legal program. In order to shore up 
this program against the ever present risk of legislation that 
runs afoul of its dictates, and especially to safeguard its author- 
ity in times when the positive legislation of a country tends to- 
ward disregarding it, secure foundations must be found to justify 
and protect the program. 
In Germany, as in the United States, constitutional princi- 
ples are cited for this purpose. The category of violation of'the 
definition as a general characteristic of crime is commonly 
thought to be founded on the provision in the West German Ba- 
sic Law (Grundgesetz, the West German constitutional docu- 
ment) that punishment can only be legislatively ~rescribed.~' 
Another commonly defended position attempts to ground the 
status of culpability as a general prerequisite of punishment on 
the article of the Basic Law that declares the dignity of the per- 
son to be i nv i~ l ab l e .~~  
But these efforts to derive some of the features of the gen- 
eral analytical system from constitutional provisions are not so 
much genuine justifications as displays of the European ten- 
dency to argue for every legal conception as if it had legislative 
origins. In fact, West Germany has no constitutional provision 
requiring that, for conduct to be punishable, it must, in addition 
to being violative of a statute, satisfy the various categories of 
the general system for analyzing criminal acts. That is, the insis- 
tence that criminal liability attaches only where conduct violates 
a definition and is wrongful and culpable is not rooted exclu- 
sively in constitutional provisions. The most that one can say is 
26. See supra note 12. 
27. GG art. 103, abs. 2. 
28. GG art. 1, abs. 1. Compare H. JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS: ALLGE- 
MEINER TEIL 99 ff. (3d ed. 1978); W. NAUCKE. STRAFRECHT. EINE EINFBHRUNG 102 ff. (4th 
ed. 1982). 
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that the cited West German constitutional provisions and the 
general structure of offenses can be traced back to a common 
legal tradition. 
C. The General Analytical System and Just Punishment 
This tradition is the real foundation for the demand that 
the positive law only be applied as the general analytical struc- 
ture allows. The structure represents the results of lengthy de- 
liberations in the realms of political and moral philosophy, as 
well as the result of numerous experiments in real world politics. 
This is, to be sure, a rather sweeping statement. We would 
do well to try to flesh out more precisely the meaning of the 
contention that the general system for analyzing criminal acts 
imparts the most durable results of prolonged endeavors in po- 
litical and moral theory and practice. 
What is meant is primarily that this general analytical 
structure is not merely a scholarly or legislative construction. I t  
is instead a reservoir of political experience gained during 
lengthy periods of legal history. One could probably show that 
the basic features of the theory were already known and valued 
long before the beginning of the modern history of criminal law. 
The political experience that the general analytical struc- 
ture of offenses seeks to secure for the decision of every case can, 
in my opinion, be described more or less as follows: Deviation 
from the accepted norms of society should not be responded to 
with uncontrolled violence. The first reaction, rather, should be 
to try to gain distance from the deviant event. This distance is 
attained by binding oneself to a definite and formal pattern of 
analysis. 
To phrase the idea pointedly, applying the statute according 
to the program of the general analytical structure is a contrast- 
ing image to a violent act as well as to any summary execution of 
punishment. The general system for analyzing criminal acts re- 
flects the discursive, objective way in which Western philosophi- 
cal tradition thinks about a subject-crime and punish- 
ment-that offers resistance to the tendency to react to breaches 
of established norms with unfettered and arbitrary power. The 
degree to which a theory of the general structure of offenses like 
the German theory is followed is an indication, I believe, of the 
distance that a system of criminal law has put between itself and 
the direct, forceful, and manipulative imposition of the will of 
the majority on deviant individuals in society. The general ana- 
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lytical structure, or its functional equivalent, is thus not only a 
practical criterion to be applied in deciding particular cases, but 
also an indicator of the level of criminal law culture a particular 
society has attained. 
From the vantage point of the general analytical structure 
and its use, one is able to specify the position of the criminal in 
the criminal process. The structure, whose main features I have 
described, guarantees that the criminal is in a precisely definable 
legal position regardless of the exact construction of a particular 
statute. The general structure guarantees (I) that the particular 
statutory violation must be established (fulfillment of the re- 
quirements of the definition); (2) that the criminal can defend 
himself with general justifications of his conduct (wrongfulness); 
and (3) that attention is devoted to the accused as a person by 
allowing him to raise any relevant excusing conditions 
(culpability). 
The theory of the general system for analyzing criminal acts 
thus contains the minimum conditions that must be maintained 
if punishment is to be just. The demand that the positive law 
only be enforced within the framework described by the struc- 
ture is nothing more than the demand that the minimum condi- 
tions for just punishment be p r e s e r ~ e d . ~ ~  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion has established that the relation- 
ship between the German criminal theory's general analytical 
structure and the positive law has a number of important 
features. 
First, whatever the content of everchanging criminal laws 
may be, the structure of offenses imbues the decision of every 
case with the results of long-term, extrastatutory considerations 
of justice that constitute some of our deepest traditions in crimi- 
nal law. The general structure represents politically, philosoph- 
ically, and morally proven traditions in a quickly evolving world 
of expedient legislation. There is much in the considerations 
that have shaped the theory of the general analytical structure 
that is traceable to particular European or German develop- 
ments. I believe some of these developments to be responses to 
29. See W. NAUCKE, STRAFRECHT: EINE EINFUHRUNG 240 ff. (4th ed. 1982); W. 
NAUCKE. GRUNDLINIEN EINER RECHTSSTAATLICHPRAKTISCHEN ALLGEMEINEN STRAFTATLEHRE 
(1979). 
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issues that are distinctively German and that do not have 
broader ramifications for other legal cultures. But it would be 
premature to treat problems concerning the general analytical 
structure as problems of a single country's law.30 Discussions 
with American colleagues have convinced me that the basic fea- 
tures of the structure are clearly perceptible in American law. 
This lends credence to the view that the values implicit in the 
general system for analyzing criminal acts have a natural lawlike 
character that transcends national boundaries. 
Second, it appears that, at  least to some extent, the emer- 
gence of a general system for analyzing criminal acts depends on 
accidents of national, political, legal, and, in particular, proce- 
dural developments. But if, as I have argued, the recognition 
and application of the general analytical system is an indicator 
of the level of criminal law culture a particular society has at- 
tained, then work on refining and developing the theory of such 
systems of analysis cannot be limited by national boundaries. 
Finally, while linguistic usage and legal conceptualization in 
the theory of general systems for structuring legal analysis may 
differ from country to country, it should not be difficult to ex- 
amine the results of national discussions of such issues in fruit- 
ful ways. By focusing on the contribution these discussions make 
to clarifying and refining the place of the criminal law in a de- 
mocracy, we can make joint strides toward a larger objective: the 
furtherance of justice in punishment. 
30. For an extended analysis of the features of the general analytical structure dis- 
cernible in common law approaches to criminal law, see G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMI- 
NAL LAW 391-875 (1978). 
